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The rapidly growing hedge fund industry has brought substantial beneﬁ  ts to ﬁ  nancial markets. At the 
same time, hedge funds can in some circumstances give rise to a number of potential risks. Not unlike in 
the period following the Asian crisis and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, governments, 
regulators, and central banks have been called upon to assess whether additional regulatory initiatives 
are required to mitigate these risks.
There are three potential regulatory objectives that can be invoked. They are investor protection, market 
integrity protection and ﬁ  nancial system protection. The link between hedge funds and the stability of the 
ﬁ  nancial system relates to the possibility that large losses in one or several hedge funds get transmitted 
to one or several large internationally active banks.
This paper discusses the beneﬁ  ts and the risks of hedge funds. It outlines the steps towards a best practice 
proposal aimed at strengthening the credit relationship between prime broker dealers and hedge funds. 
The objective of such an internationally endorsed standard would be to minimize the risks of the credit 
links between prime broker dealers and hedge funds being unwound in a disorderly fashion in times of 
extended market stress. The basic elements of the proposal are:
• Prime broker dealers should ensure that they have a complete risk metric of each of the largest hedge 
funds they are exposed to.
• Prime broker dealers should ensure that they invest sufﬁ  cient resources in collateral risk management 
systems to complement their market risk management systems.
• Prime broker dealers should permanently monitor variation margins, traditional initial margins and 
portfolio risk based or VaR-based initial margins. In addition, they should conduct rigorous periodical 
stress-testing.
• On the basis of a wide range of stress test scenarios which are routinely updated, global margin call 
simulations across all exposures should be conducted between the prime broker dealers and the largest 
hedge funds on a regular basis.
• Prime broker dealers and their most important hedge fund clients should take advantage of benign market 
conditions to work out clear terms to determine margin call procedures for different simulated scenarios 
assuming extended adverse market conditions.
• The underlying liquidity proﬁ  le of hedge funds should be an important element in conducting stress tests and 
margin call simulations as well as in determining margin call procedures under adverse market conditions.
NB: The author thanks Daniel Heller, Head of Financial Stability and Oversight of the Swiss National Bank, for his contribution to this article.
*  In effect as of May 1, 2007.ARTICLES
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D
espite extraordinary growth in the last ten 
years, the hedge fund industry remains small 
in comparison to the global markets for equity 
and debt securities. The industry’s rapid expansion and 
a number of prominent cases of shareholder activism 
partly related to hedge funds have triggered public 
policy discussions in a number of countries. Not unlike 
the period following the Asian crisis and the collapse 
of Long-Term Capital Management, governments, 
regulators and central banks have been called upon 
to assess whether additional regulatory initiatives 
are required to address a number of potential risks 
associated with hedge funds. The question of hedge 
fund regulation is currently on the agenda of the G7.
Notwithstanding renewed public scrutiny, it is 
widely accepted that hedge funds and other private 
investment vehicles have been a source of innovation 
in the global asset management industry and have 
brought substantial beneﬁ  ts to ﬁ  nancial markets. 
The fact that hedge funds are only lightly regulated 
has likely enhanced their ability to devise innovative 
and unconstrained ways to seek proﬁ  ts from their 
investment strategies. When assessing the need for 
additional regulatory measures, public authorities 
must therefore carefully consider the trade-off between 
the need for regulation to mitigate risks and the risk 
that unnecessary regulation will stiﬂ  e innovation.
This paper outlines the steps towards a “best 
practice proposal” aimed at strengthening the credit 
relationship between prime broker dealers and hedge 
funds. The speciﬁ  c objective of such a standard would 
be to minimize the risks of the credit links between 
prime brokers and hedge funds being unwound in 
a disorderly fashion in times of extended market 
stress. This “best practice proposal” is therefore 
anchored in the prudential regulatory domain and 
is aimed at promoting ﬁ  nancial stability.
In the ﬁ  rst section, the paper seeks to identify a 
number of key characteristics of hedge funds and 
discusses the recent growth and performance of the 
industry. The second section addresses the beneﬁ  ts 
that hedge funds bring to ﬁ  nancial markets. The third 
section brieﬂ  y considers three objectives for potential 
additional regulation of hedge funds. Focusing on 
the ﬁ  nancial system protection objective, the fourth 
section outlines the channels through which hedge 
funds can undermine ﬁ  nancial stability. The ﬁ  nal 
section outlines a potential “best practice proposal” to 
mitigate the risks of a disorderly unwinding of credit 
relationships between prime broker dealers and hedge 
funds under extended stressful markets conditions.
1| THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
The deﬁ   nition of hedge funds has remained 
surprisingly elusive. As the industry stands today, the 
word “hedge” has little deﬁ  nitional value.1 Nonetheless, 
a number of common characteristics can be and have 
been identiﬁ  ed.2 Hedge funds are best understood as 
potentially leveraged private investment vehicles 
deploying a wide range of  largely unconstrained 
investment strategies with the aim of  achieving 
superior absolute rates of return (alpha). To achieve 
this aim, hedge funds make extensive use of derivative 
instruments and seek investment opportunities in 
traditional as well as non-traditional market segments 
such as commodities, ﬁ  lms or stock exchanges.
The investment managers of hedge funds typically 
invest a share of their personal wealth –often in the 
form of deferred compensation– in their own hedge 
fund vehicles, which helps to align their incentives 
with the interests of the external investors. Most 
hedge funds have substantial minimum investment 
requirements. Typical investors in hedge funds are 
wealthy individuals and, increasingly, endowments, 
family ofﬁ  ces and more traditional institutional 
investors. Most hedge funds have a dual fee structure. 
The investor pays a management fee of 1% to 5%. 
In addition, hedge funds usually charge incentive 
fees on any capital gains, in some cases above a 
pre-deﬁ  ned threshold such as the Treasury bill rate. 
Industry wide, the performance fees typically vary 
between 20% and 30%, but in exceptional cases can 
be as high as 50%. Alternatively, some fund managers 
charge all expenses of the management company to 
the fund. An increasing number of managers impose 
investment lock-in periods of one to three years on 
their clients. During these lock-in periods principal, 
and in many cases proﬁ  ts, cannot be withdrawn. 
From the investors’ point of view, liquidity is further 
constrained by the fact that redemption orders can 
take three to six months to be executed.
1  Alfred Winslow Jones is credited for the creation of the ﬁ  rst hedge fund in 1949. His strategy consisted in combining long positions in undervalued stocks and short 
positions in overvalued stocks, in an attempt to minimize the inﬂ  uence of the overall stock market moves. To magnify his portfolio’s return, Jones added leverage 
(See L’Habitant, 2002)
2  See Hildebrand (2005b), McCarthy (2006) and Crockett (2007).ARTICLES
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The hedge fund industry can look back at several 
years of impressive growth. The numbers are by now 
well known. In 1990, about 500 hedge funds managed 
assets of some USD 40 billion. As Chart 1 illustrates, 
in 2006, there were approximately 9,500 hedge funds 
with about USD 1,400 billion worth of assets under 
management. The signiﬁ  cant pool of capital managed 
by proprietary trading desks of global investment banks 
is normally not included in these and similar statistics. 
Though typically not formally structured around 
hedge fund vehicles, the trading of these assets closely 
mirrors the investment activities of hedge funds. 
Moreover, the compensation schemes for investment 
banks’ proprietary desks increasingly resemble those 
used by hedge funds.
While the growth trajectory of the hedge fund industry 
is impressive, the size of the industry remains small 
compared to the global markets for equities or debt 
securities. Chart 2 illustrates this by comparing the size 
of the hedge fund industry to the total global ﬁ  nancial 
stock in 2005 as well as its various subcomponents. 
For example, the hedge fund industry is much smaller 
than the mutual fund industry. It is also smaller than 
the size of the sum of the ﬁ  ve largest trading books of 
large internationally active banks.
Chart 3 shows the development of the hedge fund 
industry since 2001, compared to the development 
of the outstanding amount of debt securities and 
outstanding credit default swaps (CDS). The growth in 
these markets has been much more substantial than the 
growth of the hedge fund industry. Even if one applies 
a relatively aggressive average leverage ratio of 5 to 
the entire hedge fund industry, its total size remains 
small compared to the more than USD 60,000 billion 
debt securities outstanding and the USD 25,000 billion 
in credit default swaps outstanding.
Two additional points are worth noting when examining 
the recent growth of the hedge fund industry. 
The distribution of hedge funds by size is heavily 
skewed towards small funds. According to recent data 
of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), there 
are close to 450 European hedge fund managers that 
manage less than USD 50 million while there are 
only a handful of European managers with assets in 
excess of USD 5 billion.3 Three trends are discernable 
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a) Bonds, Equities and Bank Assets (2005).
b) UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Barclay, BNP (Annual Reports 2005).
Sources: BIS, HFR, ICI, IMF, SIFMA, WFE
3  See McCarthy (2006).
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Global ﬁ  nancial markets have beneﬁ  ted from the 
growth of the hedge fund industry. Unconstrained 
by the structures of traditional investment guidelines 
and supported by rapidly evolving ﬁ  nancial and 
technological developments, hedge funds have 
been and continue to be an important source of 
ﬁ  nancial market innovation. Through their ﬂ  exible 
investment approaches in ﬁ  nancial markets and their 
extensive use of innovative ﬁ  nancial instruments, 
they have contributed to improved price discovery in 
ﬁ  nancial markets. A more efﬁ  cient price discovery 
mechanism renders ﬁ  nancial markets more efﬁ  cient 
in allocating capital. This is particularly welcome in 
market segments that are dominated by a few large 
commercial and investment banks such as the credit 
derivative market.6 Risk can be intermediated to a 
much greater extent than before. Every imaginable 
kind of risk is now routinely deconstructed, 
reassembled and then transferred to those who 
are willing to bear these risks at the lowest cost. 
Ultimately, this means greater diversiﬁ  cation 
opportunities for investors. Hedge funds and other 
private investment vehicles have also played a 
positive role in fostering the process of rendering 
previously illiquid assets liquid and thus tradable.
The hedge fund industry also serves as a catalyst 
for change and innovation in the traditional asset 
management industry. The traditional asset 
management business remains constrained by 
investment guidelines and typically does not employ 
leverage. Nonetheless, traditional asset managers 
have clearly become much more innovative in recent 
years. The competitive pressure emanating from 
the hedge fund industry has promoted this process. 
Complex and innovative ﬁ  nancial instruments are 
now routinely used by traditional asset managers to 
respond as ﬂ  exibly and as efﬁ  ciently as possible to 
changing market conditions. Hedge funds, together 
with the ﬁ  nancial and technological innovation 
4  See Hildebrand (2005b, pp. 45).
5  This paper does not discuss the different investment strategies prevalent in the hedge fund industry. For a detailed discussion, see some of the other contributions 
to this volume as well as Hildebrand (2005b).
6  According to the last Fitch: “Global credit derivatives survey”, (September 2006), the 10 top banking counterparties represent about 85% of the total amount of sold 
and bought outstanding positions. With regard to trading volumes, the survey indicates that hedge funds represent at least 20 to 30% of the total volume.
when analyzing recent hedge fund performance 
ﬁ  gures. First, as chart 4 illustrates, the historically 
high relative rates of return, particularly during 
the global equity bear market from 2001 to 2003, 
have apparently contributed to the strong inﬂ  ows 
of the last four years. Second, a more recent decline 
in relative performance appears to be associated 
with the rapid acceleration of inﬂ  ows, leading to an 
apparent reduction in proﬁ  t opportunities.4 Third, as 
chart 5 shows, the correlations between investment 
returns and the MSCI world returns have increased 
substantially across virtually all hedge fund strategies 
in recent years compared to the period from 1994 
to 2003.5 This would suggest that, regardless of the 
hedge fund strategies pursued, an important share of 
the recent investment returns have been generated 
Chart 4
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they have fostered, have been important forces in 
reshaping the traditional asset management industry. 
In the process, they have helped render markets 
more liquid, more efﬁ  cient, and more ﬂ  exible thus 
making them more resilient to shocks.
3| POTENTIAL REGULATORY
OBJECTIVES
Notwithstanding these important beneﬁ  ts, hedge funds 
can in some circumstances be a destabilizing force and 
give rise to a number of risks. These risks are often 
cited when calls are made for additional regulation. 
In principle, there are three potential regulatory 
objectives that can be invoked when reﬂ  ecting on the 
need for additional regulation of hedge funds. They 
are investor protection, market integrity protection 
and ﬁ  nancial system protection.7
Investor protection is, for the most part, not a crucial 
issue with regard to hedge funds. The bulk of the 
investments in individual hedge funds stem from 
wealthy individuals or professional asset managers 
who require no investor protection. Nonetheless, 
consumer protection issues are likely to become more 
pertinent as retail investors become an important 
investor class through funds of funds vehicles, as 
public pension funds begin to invest in the hedge 
fund industry and as individual hedge funds begin 
to open up to retail investors.8 A number of different 
regulatory approaches to these problems are likely 
to emerge. The pragmatic approach endorsed by 
the 2007 report of the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets is to restrict investments in 
individual hedge funds to wealthy individuals or 
professional wealth managers. An alternative would 
be to require hedge funds to spell out in a detailed 
and understandable way the risks associated with 
investments in individual hedge funds. Finally, on 
the funds of funds side, regulators could and, in some 
cases, already do require minimal diversiﬁ  cation 
standards for funds of funds that market themselves 
to certain investor classes such as retail investors or 
public pension funds.
The market integrity objective has recently 
received increased attention, not least due to the 
report and the recommendations published by the 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II 
(CRMPG II) in the summer of 2005.9 The market 
integrity problems identiﬁ   ed by the CRMPG II 
have important ramiﬁ  cation for the hedge fund 
industry. But, as Callum McCarthy has noted, 
“there is no evidence… that these problems
of market integrity, which present real issues across 
markets, are concentrated within the hedge fund 
sector”.10 Potential market integrity problems such 
as insider information, insufﬁ  ciently robust trading 
technologies, mis-valuation of proﬁ  ts and losses or 
incomplete documentation of trades are important 
issues that need to be addressed across all segments 
of the ﬁ  nancial markets. Clearly, there are close links 
between market integrity protection and ﬁ  nancial 
system protection. Indeed, the report of the CRMPG 
II is explicitly “directed at initiatives that will further 
reduce the risks of systemic ﬁ  nancial shocks and 
limit their damage when, rarely but inevitably, such 
shocks occur”.11
For central banks, ﬁ  nancial system protection is 
the most important regulatory objective. There 
are potential hedge fund speciﬁ  c risks to ﬁ  nancial 
stability even though in practice, it is often difﬁ  cult 
to distinguish potential systemic risks that arise from 
the activities of hedge funds from those of other 
important actors in the ﬁ  nancial markets.12
4| HEDGE FUNDS
AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Hedge funds can and extensively do use leverage 
as an instrument to manage their risk and extract 
proﬁ  ts  from  ﬁ   nancial markets. As mentioned 
earlier, the use of leverage is one of the deﬁ  ning 
7  See McCarthy (2006) who effectively uses the same categories although he refers to prudential issues, consumer protection and market integrity.
8  Funds of funds are investment pools which make allocation to a number of hedge funds, thereby seeking to beneﬁ  t from diversiﬁ  cation. They are typically operated 
by private banks, asset management ﬁ  rms or institutional asset managers. The managers of these funds of funds negotiate with the individual hedge funds on the 
size of investment and fee structure. These fees are passed on to clients, in addition to a management fee for the fund of funds itself.
9  See Counterparty Risk Management Group (2005).
10  See McCarthy (2006).
11  See Counterparty Risk Management Group (2005, pp. iii).
12  See McCarthy (2006).ARTICLES
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characteristics of hedge funds. The most basic form 
of leverage pertains to ﬁ  nancial  intermediaries 
(typically globally active investment banks) 
extending credit facilities to hedge funds to allow 
them to invest funds in excess of their own capital 
base.13 A more complex form of leverage employed 
by hedge funds is instrument leverage. This type 
of leverage is embedded in the use of a wide range 
of complex ﬁ  nancial instruments. At times, such 
instruments contain substantial leverage.14 The 
amount of instrument leverage employed by hedge 
funds depends on overall market conditions and on 
the trading strategies pursued by a particular hedge 
fund. Leverage is not just a risk ratio selected by 
hedge fund managers. Ultimately, hedge funds are 
constrained in the amount of leverage they can 
employ in their trading strategies by the amount of 
exposure creditors and counterparties are willing 
to accept. The exposures chosen by creditors and 
counterparties are, in turn, inﬂ  uenced by the capital 
and supervisory framework that applies to them and 
the discipline imposed on them by the market.15
The mere fact that hedge funds employ leverage does 
not in and of itself imply that they represent a risk 
to ﬁ  nancial stability. Indeed, leverage, if properly 
employed, can be a very effective risk management 
tool. Ultimately, what matters is the extent to which 
leverage impacts the total value-at-risk of a particular 
market exposure.16 The link between hedge funds 
and the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system relates to 
the possibility that large losses in one or several 
hedge funds get transmitted to one or several large 
internationally active banks. In an extreme case, this 
dynamic could be sufﬁ  ciently strong to threaten the 
solvency of one or several large banks and undermine 
the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system. In reality, it is not 
just the size of potential hedge fund losses that will 
determine whether a large bank and, ultimately, the 
stability of the ﬁ  nancial system might be adversely 
affected. The type of markets where the losses occur, 
the strength of the hedge fund’s underlying capital 
base, the degree of concentration of the losses and 
the liquidity of the positions generating the losses 
will all be crucial in determining the ultimate impact 
of the losses. This explains why the recent losses 
of the hedge fund Amaranth, though very large in 
size, had no adverse impact on the stability of the 
ﬁ  nancial system.
The primary potential transmission channel of 
systemic risk is through counterparty credit risk 
exposure. Prime broker dealers (typically large 
internationally active banks) provide leverage and 
issue credit lines to hedge funds. Through their margin 
requirements and collateral risk management, they 
also determine the amount of instrument leverage 
employed by hedge funds. A linked transmission 
channel is through negative effects on market prices 
and liquidity. In the event of extended stressful 
market conditions, prime broker dealers will likely 
demand additional collateral or, alternatively, force 
hedge funds to liquidate market positions to stop their 
own risk proﬁ  le from deteriorating. Such a process 
can further increase market volatility and further 
depress market prices. In the event of extreme or 
“fat tail” scenarios, such a self-reinforcing dynamic 
can lead to rapid reduction in market liquidity. 
As Tim Geithner (2006) states: “ﬁ  rms’ (i.e. the prime 
brokers’) incentives to minimize their own exposure 
can amplify the initial shock and impose on others the 
negative externality of a broader disruption to market 
liquidity”. The report of the CRMPG II also points out 
that credit and market risk can become blurred as 
the decline of creditworthiness and the collapse of 
asset prices feed upon one another. It states: “Position 
liquidations which –while perfectly reasonable a the 
micro level– add to macro pressures on asset prices 
which in turn trigger the initial evaporation of market 
liquidity for one or more classes of assets”.17
13 See  Garbaravičius and Dierick (2005), Hildebrand (2005a) and Geithner (2006).
14  According to data collected by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the value of futures, swaps and options on interest rates, foreign exchange and equity 
indices has been growing at an annual rate of 20% per annum since 1995.
15  See Geithner (2006).
16  According to the FSA’s survey of prime broker dealers, the average leverage calculated as the long market position of hedge funds divided by their net equity was 
around 2 to 2.5 (see McCarthy, 2006). An alternative measure developed by the Bank for International Settlements indicates that the leverage of hedge funds has 
decreased from 4 to 2 over the last 5 years, with a peak of 8 in 2004. This alternative measure captures the sensitivity of hedge funds returns to changes in the 
major risk factors. It should therefore provide a more comprehensive picture of the risk proﬁ  le of hedge funds, including the embedded leverage (for methodological 
details, see Bank for International Settlements, 2005).
17  See Counterparty Risk Management Group (2005, pp. 7).ARTICLES
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5| TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL
 “ BEST PRACTICE PROPOSAL”
Based on everything we know, hedge funds bring 
substantial beneﬁ  ts to ﬁ  nancial markets. But they 
also constitute a potential source of systemic risk. 
To be more precise, “hedge funds can become 
the transmission mechanism of systemic risk 
because they borrow from and trade with regulated 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as prime brokers and 
investment banks”.18 Any ﬁ  nancial  regulatory 
authority with statutory responsibilities to promote 
ﬁ  nancial stability therefore has an obligation to 
think about possible measures to mitigate systemic 
risk emanating from the activities of hedge funds 
or other private investment vehicles with similar 
characteristics. Still, the threshold for justifying 
additional regulatory measures should be set high. 
Ill-considered regulatory initiatives will achieve little 
and risk being counterproductive. Any additional 
regulatory initiative to address potential threats to 
ﬁ  nancial stability emanating from the hedge fund 
industry should be rooted in three fundamental 
regulatory principles. First, the focus should be on 
the activities of the largest hedge funds. In principle, 
they are the ones that could generate sufﬁ  ciently 
large losses to threaten the solvency of a large bank.19
Second, potential regulatory initiatives should 
address the relationships of these funds with the 
most important global banks acting as prime broker 
dealers. Third, the main objective of any potential 
new regulatory initiative should be to reduce the risk 
of a sudden liquidation wave.
These principles imply that the most sensible 
regulatory response to the potential systemic risks 
emanating from the activities of hedge funds would 
be an internationally endorsed effort to agree on 
a best practice proposal that would govern the 
relationship between prime broker dealers and 
hedge fund. This would help to enhance market 
discipline. The international dimension must be 
emphasized here. A best practice proposal that is 
not internationally adhered to inevitably runs the 
risk of being without teeth or distorting competition. 
Moreover, as the recent President’s Working Group 
Report made clear, because the most important 
key creditors and counterparties to hedge funds 
and other private investment pools are active in 
many different jurisdictions throughout the world, 
international policy collaboration is essential if 
positive results are to be achieved.20
The speciﬁ  c aim of an internationally endorsed “best 
practice proposal” should be to minimize the risks of 
the credit links between prime broker dealers and 
hedge funds being unwound in a disorderly fashion 
in a market environment characterized by extended 
stress. Why this speciﬁ  c emphasis on mitigating the 
risk of disorderly unwinding of credit links between 
hedge funds and prime broker dealers in times of 
stress? An important new element since the late 1990s 
is the tremendous innovation in complex structured 
ﬁ  nancial instruments. Financial innovation has made 
markets more liquid, more ﬂ  exible and in many ways 
more resilient. On the other hand, new categories of 
complex ﬁ  nancial products have also rendered the 
credit relationship between prime broker dealers and 
hedge funds more challenging. Many of these new 
products are traded on an over-the-counter (OTC) 
basis and have to be marked to model rather than to 
market. Another feature of OTC products is that they 
generate a potential future credit exposure which 
depends on the volatility of the underlying asset. This 
potential future exposure is a multiple of the current 
credit exposure and should be adequately covered by 
initial margins.21 Moreover, many of the new highly 
complex structured products have yet to be tested in 
market environments of heightened and extended 
stress. It is important to remember that much 
of the modelling underlying the pricing of complex 
structured ﬁ  nancial products is impacted favourably 
by the sustained low volatility environment that has 
characterized global markets until very recently. In 
addition, the recent protracted period of abundant 
liquidity and low volatility has likely contributed 
to an increase in the exposure of hedge funds and 
other market participants to riskier and less liquid 
assets. As a result, the mismatch between the average 
liquidity of the underlying portfolios of hedge funds 
and the liquidity offered to investors of hedge funds 
is likely to have increased. A potentially heightened 
18  See Fung and Hsieh (2006, pp. 27).
19  See McCarthy (2006, pp. 4).
20  See The President’s Working Group (2007, pp. 5).
21  See Geithner (2006)ARTICLES
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liquidity mismatch is a further reason to focus future 
regulatory initiatives on measures to mitigate the risks 
of disorderly unwinding of the credit relationship 
between hedge funds and prime broker dealers.
The following paragraphs are an attempt to identify the 
potential key elements of such best practice proposal.
• Prime broker dealers should ensure that they have 
a complete risk metric of each of the largest hedge 
funds they are exposed to. This does not mean they 
require information on speciﬁ  c trading positions. 
But they need to be able to assess the aggregate 
risk exposure of their largest hedge fund clients 
vis-à-vis the entire prime broker dealer community. 
For example, a prime broker dealer should be aware 
of the margining terms agreed by its largest hedge 
fund clients with other important creditors or 
prime broker dealers. A recent survey by the FSA 
in the United Kingdom has concluded that only 
21 of 152 hedge funds had more than one prime 
broker.22 While this is a comforting statistic, the 
largest and systematically most important hedge 
funds are likely to continue to deal with several 
prime brokers, not least to ensure anonymity 
and avoid front-running when executing their 
trading strategies.
• Prime broker dealers should ensure that they invest 
sufﬁ  cient resources in collateral risk management 
systems to complement their market risk management 
systems. The quality of margin statements should 
be a priority, particularly with regard to margins for 
options or other more complicated derivatives. In a 
time of crisis, weak collateral management systems 
are a potential source of margin uncertainty and 
future margin call disputes between prime broker 
dealers and hedge fund.
• Prime broker dealers should permanently monitor 
variation margins, traditional initial margins and 
portfolio risk-based or VaR-based initial margins. 
In  addition, rigorous periodical stress-testing 
should be conducted. VaR-based initial margins, in 
particular, should be stress-tested regularly, i.e. they 
should be compared to the potential credit exposure 
that could materialize in stress situations. Volatility 
has declined signiﬁ  cantly until most recently. As a 
result, so have margin levels in VaR-based systems. 
Stress test scenarios should be updated accordingly. 
They should include large simultaneous shocks to 
market and volatility levels.
• On the basis of a wide range of stress test scenarios 
which are routinely updated, global margin 
call simulations across all exposures should be 
conducted between the prime broker dealers and the 
largest hedge funds on a regular basis. Ideally, such 
margin call simulations should also be conducted 
on an aggregate basis. This would allow a particular 
prime broker dealer to get a sense of the impact 
of simultaneous margin calls by all prime broker 
dealers exposed to one or several hedge funds.
• Prime broker dealers and their most important 
hedge fund clients should take advantage of 
benign market conditions to work out clear terms 
to determine margin call procedures for different 
simulated scenarios assuming extended adverse 
market conditions. This will enhance predictability 
in the credit relationship between prime broker 
dealers and their largest hedge fund clients. Such 
predictability mitigates the risk of disorderly 
unwinding of the credit links. Moreover, subject to 
the underlying liquidity proﬁ  le of a particular hedge 
fund, such margin call procedure agreements should 
have as long a time horizon as possible. This would 
further reduce the risk of cyclical market volatility 
triggering disorderly unwinding of positions.
• The underlying liquidity proﬁ  le of hedge funds 
should be an important element in conducting 
stress test and margin call simulation as well as in 
determining margin call procedures under adverse 
market conditions. To be more precise, the match 
or mismatch between the liquidity of a portfolio 
of a hedge fund and the liquidity the hedge fund 
offers to its clients should be an important factor 
in determining the speciﬁ  c margin arrangements 
between a prime broker dealer and a hedge fund.
22  See McCarthy (2006, pp. 4).ARTICLES
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A best practice standard along these lines would have many advantages. It would tackle a coordination 
problem between the largest hedge funds and the most important prime brokers. It would promote ﬁ  nancial 
stability by addressing what is arguably the most likely potential systemic threat emanating from the hedge 
fund industry: namely the risk that in a market environment characterized by extended stress, insufﬁ  ciently 
prudent counterparty risk management could lead to credit losses of the prime broker dealers and a 
pro-cyclical liquidation wave of hedge fund positions against the backdrop of diminishing liquidity and 
potentially rapidly declining market prices. In an extreme case, such events could conceivably jeopardize 
the solvency of a large internationally active bank, thus potentially undermining the stability of the global 
ﬁ  nancial system.
A well-designed “best practice proposal” would strengthen market discipline and avoid misallocating scarce 
regulatory resources. Moreover, it would not require any direct regulatory interference with regard to market 
pricing and would therefore be market-friendly. If speciﬁ  ed appropriately and adopted universally, it could 
have a constructive effect on the risk appetite of the most important prime broker dealers. Finally, it would 
be consistent with the recent demand by the President’s Working Group that the most important “creditors 
and counterparties must commit resources and maintain appropriate policies, procedures, and protocols to 
deﬁ  ne, implement, and continually enhance best risk management practices. Those policies, procedures, 
and protocols should address how the quality of information from a private pool of capital should affect 
margin, collateral, and other credit terms and other aspects of counterparty risk management”.23
Clearly much work remains to be done to make such a “best practice proposal” operational and productive in 
the sense of enhancing ﬁ  nancial stability. In principle, a proposal along these lines would not require formal 
regulation. It could be implemented by the industry as a “best practice standard”. Ongoing monitoring of the 
standard could then be conducted by national ﬁ  nancial supervisory agencies. Initially, regulators need to 
gain a better understanding of how collateral and margin practices are evolving in light of the ongoing and 
rapid product innovation in the credit markets and the heightened competition surrounding the relationship 
between prime broker dealers and the most important representatives of the hedge fund industry. This fact-
ﬁ  nding exercise can only be conducted effectively in concert between the regulatory authorities of the most 
prominent ﬁ  nancial centres, senior hedge fund managers and representatives and risk management experts 
from the most important global ﬁ  nancial institutions. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the SEC and 
the UK FSA have recently initiated such a process. In cooperation with other supervisory authorities, they are 
conducting periodic surveys of the exposures of most important prime broker dealers to hedge funds. Such 
a cooperative framework could form the basis for moving towards a “best practice proposal”.
23  See The President’s Working Group (2007, pp. 3).ARTICLES
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